Final thoughts on the Euro crisis: when markets and politics collide

Blame the markets for Europe’s mess. But blame the politicos too

Before I begin my third and last post on the Euro crisis (read the other two here and here), let’s recap on the two main points I’ve made so far. The first point is that a Greek collapse, as catastrophic as it would be for the Greeks themselves, should not in itself endanger the integrity of the Eurozone as a whole. The second point is that if a Eurozone meltdown is going to happen, it will be because a bigger country, most likely Italy, will be the one crashing out. But the economic and political fundamentals of Italy are no worse than Japan’s which has not faced anything even remotely like the fury which the markets have unleashed upon the hapless Italians. So now this leads me to the third point. The Euro crisis is not a crisis of macroeconomic and debt fundamentals but a market crisis of political confidence displaying all the characteristics of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

“If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.” – William Isaac Thomas (sociologist)

We might be seeing a lot more of this soon

We might be seeing a lot more of this soon

The self-fulfilling prophecy is without a doubt the most pernicious of all economic phenomena. It is where rationality gets trampled by the animal spirits which more often than not guide the behavior of economic agents, that is, human beings (you are more likely to find the yeti before you find homo economicus). In financial markets, this is all the more evident and all but the most fervent apostles of the efficient-markets hypothesis (which assumes that markets always perfectly factor in all available information) cannot deny that the behaviour of markets often seems to be guided more by euphoria and paranoia than cool, calculating logic. Self-fulfilling prophecies are the catalysts of bank runs, of stock market collapses, and of turning a small country default into an economic Armaggeddon the likes of which capitalism has not yet experienced in its two centuries of existence. In the latter case, it is because no other economic force has the power to turn a problem of illiquidity into a much more dangerous one of insolvency. Ultimately, this is what markets have created out of Greece and nearly done the same for the smaller troubled peripheral countries, mainly Portugal and Ireland. If they do it to Spain or (especially) Italy, we’re screwed. Continue reading